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Article 4

Managing Summary Judgment
Steven S. Gensler & Lee H. Rosenthal"
Twenty-five years ago, during a four-month span in late spring of
1986, the Supreme Court issued three decisions interpreting and
applying Rule 56.1
Judges, lawyers, and-perhaps especiallyacademics still debate the impact that "Trilogy" of cases had on
summary-judgment practice. Conventional wisdom long held that the
Trilogy caused a fundamental shift in pretrial practice by leading
lawyers to be more aggressive in seeking summary judgment and by
leading judges to be more willing to grant it. 2 Recent empirical work by
the Federal Judicial Center ("FJC") challenges those beliefs. According
to the FJC's data, the greatest increase in federal-court summaryjudgment filings occurred in the ten years preceding the Trilogy, not
after. 3 And the FJC study found no statistically significant change in
how often motions were granted. 4
Welcome D. & W. DeVier Pierson Professor, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
United States District Judge, Southern District of Texas. We thank the Seattle University
School of Law and the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal for their excellent work hosting
and publishing this Colloquium respectively. These are our personal views, not the views of any
of the rulemaking committees on which we have served.
1. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc.. 477
U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
2. See Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion,"
"Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day In Court and Jury Trial
Commitments?. 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 984 (2003); Jack H. Friedenthal & Joshua E. Gardner.
Judicial Discretion to Deny Summary Judgment in the Era of Managerial Judging, 31 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 91, 103 (2002) ("Since 1986, when the Court decided the trilogy, lower federal courts
appear much more willing to grant summary judgment."); see also Patricia M. Wald. Summary
Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1935 (1998) ("Its flame lit by [the trilogy], and fueled
by the overloaded dockets of the last two decades, summary judgment has spread swiftly through
the underbrush of undesirable cases."): Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second
Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 73-74 (1990) ("[The trilogy] brought
into the battle against excess litigation a weapon held largely in reserve by the federal courts since
the promulgation of the Federal Rules in 1938."). Some even drew a link between the Trilogy
and the "vanishing" civil jury trial. See Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing
Trial: Implications of the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1333 (2005) (discussing the
expansion of summary judgment and its role in reducing the number of federal civil trials).
3. See Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal
District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 882 (2007) (noting that the increase prior to
the 1986 trilogy was "unexpected by many legal commentators") id. at 890 ("Statistically
**
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We probably will never understand exactly what role the Trilogy
played in shaping summary judgment as we know it today. What is
unquestionably clear, however, is that the Trilogy continues to hold a
central place in modern summary-judgment jurisprudence and practice.5
Who among us cannot recite (or at least paraphrase) Justice Rehnquist's
famous line: "Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as
a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the
Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed 'to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."' 6 In a single
pithy sentence, the Court simultaneously assured judges already open to
summary judgment that their decisions would not be unduly secondguessed and burnished summary judgment's image among those judges
who had been less receptive. 7 For our purposes, whether the Trilogy
actually caused a fundamental change in summary-judgment practice or
was simply Justice Rehnquist preaching to already converted judges is
beside the point. It is no exaggeration to say that one cannot understand
modern summary-judgment practice without understanding the Trilogy
and the message it sent to courts and litigants about the role of summary
judgment in our civil pretrial system.8
That being said, if we were asked to identify the dominant
phenomenon in the federal pretrial landscape during the twenty-five
years since the Trilogy, it would not be the change in attitudes about
summary judgment. It would be the rise of active judicial case
management. 9 The Trilogy itself came just three years after the
landmark 1983 amendments to Rules 16 and 26 that formally embraced
active judicial case management as the civil justice system's best hope
significant increases in summary judgment motions over time took place almost exclusively
between 1975 and 1986, prior to the trilogy.").
4. Id. at 886-89 (controlling for differences across courts and types of cases).
5. To the extent case citations are a measure of impact, as of 2006 the Trilogy cases were cited
more frequently than any other federal-court cases. See Adam M. Steinman, The Irrepressible
Myth of Celotex: ReconsideringSummary Judgment Burdens Twenty Years After the Trilogy. 63
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 81, 87 (2006) ("Anderson and Celotex [had] over 72.000 citations by
federal and state courts.").
6. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327.
7. See WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER, ALAN HIRSCH & DAVID J. BARRANS. FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
THE ANALYSIS AND DECISION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS 3-7 (1991) (discussing
developments from 1938 to 1986 that caused or manifested judicial reluctance to fully embrace
Rule 56).
8. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of
Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 99
(1988) ("[T]he Court's rhetoric in these three cases changed the tone of judicial perspective on
Rule 56, creating a climate more conducive to more frequent use and granting of the motion.").
9. See Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management: Caught In the Crossfire, 60 DUKE L.J.
669, 674-88 (2010) (chronicling the rise of judicial case management in the federal courts).
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for controlling pretrial expense and delay.' 0 Since 1986, several rounds
of amendments have expanded the federal scheme's commitment to,
and reliance on, active judicial case management." The Trilogy was
born into a pretrial system struggling to adapt to this new way of
thinking about the respective roles of judges and litigants.
As we see it-from our vantage points on the bench and in the
academy, and as former participants in the civil rulemaking processactive judicial case management is defined by two essential features.
One is custom tailoring the pretrial process and the trial itself to what
makes sense for the particular case. The second is communication
between the parties and the court. These two features work in tandem. 12
Rule 16 and its enthusiastic endorsement of case management are based
on recognizing that no one-size-fits-all model can efficiently and fairly
apply to every case. 13 It is the judges who are responsible, using the
parties' suggestions and information, for custom tailoring the pretrial
process to the needs of each case. 14 To carry out that task, Rules 16 and
26 give judges a "full quiver" of case-management tools. 15 In using

10. See ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND
LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 21, 33 (1984) (explaining how revised Rules 16 and 26 became tools
for judicial case management).
I1. See Gensler, supra note 9, at 679-83 (discussing case-management-oriented amendments
since 1986): Lee H. Rosenthal. From Rules of Procedure to How Lawyers Litigate: 'Twixt the
Cup and the Lip. 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 227. 235-38 (2010) (discussing discovery amendments
from 1993 to present and noting intersection with judicial case management).
12. See generally COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. & CASE MGMT., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
U.S.. CIVIL LITIGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL 14-16 (2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter CIVIL
LITIGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL] (emphasizing relation between communication with the
parties and tailoring the case-management plan to the needs of the case); WILLIAM W.
SCHWARZER & ALAN HIRSCH, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,THE ELEMENTS OF CASE MANAGEMENT: A
POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 3-5 (2d ed. 2006) (same).
13. See Gensler, supra note 9, at 719 (explaining how case management responds to the need
for judges to custom-fit the general rules to the needs of their cases); Rosenthal, supra note 11. at
240 ("[Rule 16] quite properly recognizes that flexibility is paramount. Judges do their work in
very different ways. Cases are different.").
14. See Rosenthal, supra note 11. at 241 ("The point of Rule 16 is for the judge, working with
the lawyers and the litigants, to tailor a discovery and case-management plan that works for the
particular case."); Gensler, supra note 9, at 697 ("Judges individually tailor the pretrial process in
each case, sometimes by guiding the parties to make better choices, sometimes by working with
the parties to help them agree on the size and scope of the pretrial activities, and sometimes by
resolving disputes and imposing limits when the parties cannot agree or when the parties both
engage in unreasonable behaviors.").
15. See Thomas D. Rowe. Jr.. Authorized Managerialism Under the FederalRules-and the
Extent of Convergence with Civil-Law Judging, 36 Sw. U. L. REV. 191, 196 (2007) (noting that
Rule 16 gives district judges "more managerial arrows than can fit in an ordinary quiver").
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those tools, judges can look to the overriding objective of Rule 116 and
the core principles identified in the Rules-like proportionality in
discoveryl7-for guidance. But there are few bright-line or hard-andfast rules when it comes to case management. It is an inherently
discretionary process. To effectively tailor discovery and pretrialmotions practice to what is appropriate for the case in question, the
judge needs information from the parties. Only a sufficient amount of
good and reliable information from the parties will accurately identify
the real and important issues in the case and the best ways to investigate
and resolve them. Communication between the court and the parties is
the fuel that makes the case-management engine run.
Given the year when the Trilogy was born and the era in which it
grew up, one might expect modern summary-judgment practice to
reflect a high level of custom tailoring and communication. But the
opposite seems true.
Summary-judgment practice has become
routinized and prescribed. It has become a one-dance-fits-all minuet of
motions and briefs and responses, followed in due course by a written
opinion, usually without any other communication on the topic between
the judge and the lawyers. The lawyers and judges don't talk about the
summary-judgment motions that might be made. And they don't talk
about the motions that have been made. As a result, the judge has no
opportunity to tailor the work leading up to the summary-judgment
motion, or the work needed to resolve it, to what makes sense for the
case. It is the antithesis of the active judicial case-management model.
In many ways, summary-judgment practice seems to have missed the
case-management revolution.
We think summary-judgment practice would be greatly improved if it
embraced and incorporated the core case-management values of
communication and custom-tailoring.
We have three specific
suggestions. First, we urge courts to incorporate anticipated summaryjudgment motions into their early case planning, particularly into
discovery planning. Thoughtfully deployed, summary judgment can
avoid needless pretrial as well as needless trial time, work, and
expense. Second, we urge courts to consider holding premotion
conferences with the parties-preferably in person but at least by
telephone or videoconference-before summary-judgment motions are
made or briefed. A discussion with the parties before any motion is

16. FED. R. Civ. P. 1. The words of Rule I have attained a nearly iconic status: the Civil
Rules "should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy. and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding." Id.
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).
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made-which usually only takes a short time-can greatly reduce the
largest expense and effort of modern summary judgment: the cost of
making, briefing, and responding to motions. A discussion between the
judge and the parties can avoid the filing of futile motions, can identify
issues that can be resolved without a motion and full briefing, can
identify issues that can be presented and resolved with only limited
briefing, and can focus the arguments and proofs that do require full
briefing for proper presentation. Exhaustively prepared summaryjudgment motions that address every possible issue consume enormous
resources' -both from the parties and the court-and much of it is
simply a waste of time, effort, and money. Third, we urge courts to
consider hearing oral argument on their summary-judgment motions.
Just as holding a premotion conference allows the judge to tailor the
motion process to the needs of the case before briefs are written and
supporting materials assembled, holding oral argument allows the judge
to tailor the resolution process to what works best for resolving that
particular motion. One-size-fits-all works no better for the judges who
must decide motions than it does for the parties who make them.
The main emphasis of this Article is how increased communication
can improve the efficiency of the summary-judgment process. Better,
more frequent, and more detailed communication between judges and
parties can help reduce unnecessary cost and delay for the parties and
unnecessary work for the judges. We take this as our point of emphasis
for two reasons.
First, it responds directly to some of the most pointed and loudest
criticisms of our federal civil justice system we hear-that excessive
and disproportionate cost is driving people out of the court system or
causing them to enter into settlements based on cost-avoidance rather
than on the strengths or weaknesses of the merits. 1 9 That's not to say
that we adopt those criticisms in full. Indeed, we worry that some of

18. See Diane P. Wood. Summary Judgment and the Law of Unintended Consequences, 36
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 231. 232 (2011) ("Enormous resources go into the preparation of
summary judgment motions.").
19. See, e.g., AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM.
LEGAL Sys.. FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL
LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 2 (2009) [hereinafter ACTL/IAALS FINAL REPORT] ("Some

deserving cases are not brought because the cost of pursuing them fails a rational cost-benefit test
while some other cases of questionable merit and smaller cases are settled rather than tried
because it costs too much to litigate them."); ABA SECTION OF LITIG. MEMBER SURVEY ON
CIVIL PRACTICE: DETAILED REPORT 2 (2009) [hereinafter ABA SURVEY] (citing survey results

that 82% of respondents reported they had turned away cases due to cost and that 83% of
respondents believe cost forces cases to settle contrary to the merits).
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those criticisms, and some of the responses, are characterized by
overstatement. But insofar as summary-judgment practice has become
a part of the problem-or is failing to be part of the solution-we owe it
to the users of the system to make helpful changes when they are
possible. 2 0
Second, the Supreme Court itself has lauded the efficiency and costsavings benefits of summary judgment.21 In Celotex in particular, the
Supreme Court positioned summary judgment as a bulwark against
unnecessary delay and expense. 2 2 After declaring summary judgment
to be not only not disfavored but in fact integral to the system, Justice
Rehnquist explained that summary judgment avoids "unwarranted
consumption of public and private resources" by avoiding trials. 2 3
Some have questioned whether that is true, arguing that trial
adjudication would be less expensive. 24
We think the standard "summary judgment versus trial" comparison
is incomplete. First, it too often falls into the trap of thinking of

20. See EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., LITIGATION COSTS IN
CIVIL CASES: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY

COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 6, 8 (2010) (finding that, all other things being equal, summary
judgment increased litigation costs by 24% for plaintiffs and 22% for defendants) ABA SURVEY,
supra note 19, at 114 (reporting that 62% of plaintiffs agreed with the statement that "[s]ummary
judgment practice increases cost and delay without proportionate benefit"). Not surprisingly,
plaintiff-side attorneys and defense-side attorneys disagree about the value of summary judgment
and whether the procedure is being used appropriately. See EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E.
WILLGING. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ATTORNEY SATISFACTION WITH THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES

10 (2010) (reporting contrasting views on value); THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE III,
FED. JUDICIAL CTR.. IN THEIR WORDS: ATTORNEY VIEWS ABOUT COSTS AND PROCEDURES IN
FEDERAL CIVIL LITIGATION 29 (2010) [hereinafter WILLGING & LEE, IN THEIR WORDS]

("[P]laintiff and defendant attorneys disagreed sharply about whether summary judgment is used
appropriately.").
21. See Issacharoff & Loewenstein. supra note 2, at 100 ("The premise of the summary
judgment trilogy is that a broader use of summary judgment should help alleviate the burdens on
the federal courts by allowing pretrial disposition of meritless claims.").
22. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317. 327 (1986) (noting that summary judgment is
a key component of the Federal Rules that helps to ensure "the just. speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action").
23. Id.; see also Martin Louis. FederalSummary Judgment Doctrine:A CriticalAnalysis, 83
YALE L.J. 745. 769 (1974) ("The primary function of summary judgment is to intercept factually
deficient claims and defenses in advance of trial.").
24. See John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 533 (2007)
("[S]ummary judgment is more expensive than trial."): D. Theodore Rave. Note. Questioning the
Efficiency of Summary Judgment, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 876 (2006) (attempting to frame an
efficiency formula and questioning whether conditions exist in which summary judgment would
be efficient under that formula): Stempel. supra note 8. at 171 ("[O]ne can argue that the use of
summary judgment may exact a higher total cost to the system than it saves the system and its
participants.").
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summary judgment solely as a post-discovery mechanism whose
benefits are limited to avoiding a certain number of trials. 25 But when
judges and lawyers talk about summary judgment early in the case, and
incorporate summary-judgment planning into the case-management
process, the benefits include avoiding unnecessary discovery and other
pretrial work. Second, we think current summary-judgment practices
are making the process far more costly and burdensome than it needs to
be. With just a short conversation between the judge and the parties,
many motions that prophylactically raise and then exhaustively brief
every possible issue can be avoided or significantly streamlined. If
better communication between judges and lawyers can increase the
benefits of summary judgment while also reducing the cost and effort
needed to achieve those benefits, that has obvious implications for the
efficiency equation.
By focusing on cost and efficiency, we do not mean to be dismissive
of other concerns that have been raised about summary judgment since
the Trilogy. Rule 56 has been challenged as unconstitutional.2 6 It has
been said that judges have been abusing the procedure by resolving fact
disputes under the guise of making legal rulings. 27 It has been argued
that judges have been systematically misapplying the rule because their
"cognitive illiberalism" makes them inherently bias prone when
determining what a "reasonable jury" might conclude based on a "cold"
paper (or video) record. 2 8 And it has been argued that certain categories
of cases (particularly civil rights claims brought by women) are
especially at risk of being adversely affected by modern summaryjudgment practices. 29 These are all important topics. If the procedure
was unconstitutional, or if judges were applying it in a way that
systematically deprived litigants of jury rights or discriminated against
identifiable categories of litigants, cost savings or efficiency gains
25. See, e.g., Rave, supra note 24, at 886-87 (discussing summary judgment as a case disposal
tool).
26. See Suja A. Thomas. Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional.93 VA. L. REV. 139.
144-45 (2007) (arguing that summary judgment violates historical English common law jury trial
procedures and is therefore unconstitutional according to the Seventh Amendment).
27. See Miller. supra note 2. at 1064-71 (discussing cases in which the judge assumed the role
of fact finder).
28. See Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffian & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to
Believe?: Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARv. L. REV. 837, 895
901 (2009) (discussing Scott v. Harrisas an example of "cognitive illiberalism").
29. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal
Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REv. 705, 734 (2008) ("My thesis is not that the dangers of
summary judgment arise only in cases of women plaintiffs, but that they are particularly acute in
these cases and that we can learn a great deal about the dangers of summary judgment in general
by examining them.").
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would not overcome those harms. But those arguments are beyond the
scope of this Article. Whether you like it or not, summary judgment is
an accepted part of the federal pretrial process. The Supreme Court has
given no indication that it thinks summary judgment is unconstitutional
or that it is not capable of fair administration. 3 0 Recognizing that, our
focus is on working toward a more effective and efficient administration
of summary-judgment motions.
We also do not intend to suggest that cost reduction is the only value
at stake. Though there is no consensus on all the core values a
procedural system should advance, most commentators agree that the
core procedural values include decisional accuracy, process
transparency, and participation, in addition to efficiency. 3 1 We think
our suggestions enhance each of these core procedural values.
Compared to current practice, our suggested practices are more
transparent, more participatory, and, we think, more likely to yield
accurate summary-judgment findings and conclusions. Though our
emphasis in this Article will be on the cost and burden issues as
described above, we will also try to highlight how our proposals further
these other procedural values as well.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses how judges can
better integrate summary judgment into the larger case-management
picture to aid in narrowing and focusing the case before and during
discovery, not just for trial. Part II discusses how judges can better
manage the summary-judgment process itself, principally by engaging
in a direct dialogue with the parties in premotion conferences and oral
argument. Broadly speaking, Part I discusses ways that judges can
maximize the benefits available from summary judgment, while Part II
discusses ways that judges can minimize the costs and burdens of
seeking those benefits. Part III concludes.

1.

TALKING ABOUT SUMMARY JUDGMENT AT THE START OF THE CASE

Rule 56 would make any lawyer's-and any judge's-list of most
influential pretrial rules. It's not just that summary judgment stands as

30. See Edward Brunet, Summary Judgment Ls Constitutional,93 IowA L. REV. 1625. 164248 (2008) (canvassing Supreme Court decisions in comparable contexts like motions for directed
verdict).
31. See Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561.
593-94 (2001) (listing six basic procedural values); Lawrence B. Solum, ProceduralJustice. 78
S. CAL. L. REv. 181, 305-06 (2004) (listing principles of procedural justice anchored around
accuracy, cost, and participation): see also Robert G. Bone, Improving Rule 1: A Master Rule for
the FederalRules, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 287. 302 (2010) (proposing new text for Rule 1 based on
procedural values including accuracy, efficiency, and participation).
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the gateway to trial, though that is an important role. 32 Rather, the very
existence of the summary-judgment mechanism affects the way lawyers
conduct discovery and prepare their cases long before any motions are
made. Most lawyers start thinking about summary judgment from the
moment they start working on their cases. They think about the motions
they might make and about the motions the other side might make.
Those thoughts shape discovery requests and responses. For the most
part, however, the parties do not talk about summary judgment-with
each other or with the judge-during the pretrial process. Far too often,
the communication between the judge and the lawyers about summary
judgment is limited to picking a dispositive motion deadline (and, not
infrequently, ruling on requests that it be extended).
We think summary judgment should be discussed early in the case as
part of the Rule 16 case-planning and case-management process.
Properly and strategically used, summary judgment can be an important
tool for setting pretrial priorities and for identifying issues that offer the
best chance of expeditiously resolving or narrowing the case. For that
to happen, however, judges and parties must start talking with each
other about the role that summary judgment might play in the particular
case. If judges and parties wait until discovery is over before talking
about summary judgment, it will be too late to consider how planning
the discovery in light of the anticipated motions might have helped to
avoid needless discovery work and expense. 33 A small amount of time
spent talking about summary judgment early in the case usually pays
handsome dividends later in the form of a more focused and efficient
pretrial process.
Our discussion of summary-judgment planning proceeds as follows.
Subpart A begins by setting the stage. In most cases, judges and
lawyers are not seriously talking about summary judgment at the caseplanning stage, and we think that is a major missed opportunity.
Subpart B turns to how planning for likely summary-judgment motions
early in the case can help to narrow the issues and focus discoverytwo primary goals of active judicial case management. Subpart C
examines the role that summary-judgment motion planning can play in
32. See EDWARD J. BRUNET & MARTIN H. REDISH, SUMMARY JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW
§ 1:1, at 2-3 (3d ed. 2006) (describing gatekeeping function).
33. See id § 1:1, at 10 ("Because much of the prohibitive expense and potential abuse flow
from a burdensome discovery process, rather than from the actual trial, traditional use of the
summary judgment device does not provide an answer to this problem."). This treatise also
acknowledges a strategic dilemma for lawyers. It first explains the strategic advantages to
waiting until discovery has closed to move for summary judgment. Id. § 10:8. at 430. But as the
authors of that treatise later admit, "such a strategy precludes the beneficial use of summary
judgment as a means to avoid expensive discovery." Id.
AND PRACTICE
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helping parties reach informed settlements earlier in the pretrial process
than otherwise would be possible.
Subpart D locates summaryjudgment planning within the existing Civil Rules scheme,
demonstrating that the Rules already facilitate-and even encourageincorporating summary-judgment planning into the case-planning
process. Finally, subpart E addresses the lingering misconception that
summary judgment is simply a "post discovery" tool limited to avoiding
trial expense.
It concludes that summary judgment can yield
comparable benefits during the pretrial process and that the path
forward is for judges and parties to start talking about summary
judgment early in the case.
A. Summary Judgment and Silence: The Missed Opportunity
Summary judgment directly affects a significant percentage of civil
cases in federal court. Empirical studies tell us that, overall, summary
judgment is sought in somewhere between 15% and 20% of cases. 34
Within that population, 88% of the motions seek to resolve the entire
case while 12% are motions for partial summary judgment. 35 The filing
rate is higher in some districts than in others. 3 6 It also varies by case
type. For example, summary-judgment motions are more common in
civil rights cases and employment discrimination cases. 37 If you focus
on cases that survive into discovery, the summary-judgment motion
filing rate may in fact be significantly higher than 20%. Lawyers
reported summary-judgment rulings (not just filings) in roughly 26% of
their cases that had discovery activity, and in over 60% of their cases
that were long-pending or survived to trial. 38 All of the data point to the
conclusion that summary judgment has a direct impact on a substantial
part of the civil docket.
But summary judgment impacts cases long before any motions are
filed, and even when they never come. Lawyers often start thinking
about summary judgment as soon as they start working on a case, and
34. See Cecil et al., supra note 3, at 882 fig.1; JOE CECIL & GEORGE CORT, FED. JUDICIAL
CTR., REPORT ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRACTICE ACROSS DISTRICTS WITH VARIATIONS IN
LOCAL RULES 11 tbl.11 (2008).

35. See CECIL & CORT, supra note 34, at 7 tbl.2.
36. See Cecil et al., supra note 3, at 883 (ranging from low teens to the high twenties); CECIL
& CORT, supra note 34. at 3 ("As in previous research, we found great variation in summary
judgment practice across individual districts.").
37. See Cecil et al., supra note 3, at 884 fig.3; CECIL & CORT, supra note 34, at II tbl. 11.
38. See EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER NATIONAL. CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 14 & n.6 (2009) ("Rulings on

summary judgment motions were much more common in the cases terminated by trial.").
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the prospect of summary judgment influences how they conduct
discovery. 39 For defendants, the prospect of making a summaryjudgment motion often means taking discovery not to gather essential
information for trial but to create the foundation for a Celotex-type "no
evidence" motion. For plaintiffs, the prospect of having to oppose a
summary-judgment motion often means expanding discovery far
beyond gathering essential materials for trial. The looming threat of
having to respond to a "no evidence" motion-which could be based on
any element of the plaintiffs case-can lead plaintiffs to assemble
proofs on even the most peripheral matters and reduce them to
admissible form in case they are needed later. 40 Judge Brock D.
Hornby astutely summed it up this way:
To seek or resist summary judgment, lawyers must discover-in
advance-all the evidence needed for trial and more, including expert
opinions. . . . At summary judgment, lawyers cannot rely on what
they expect witnesses will testify or on hope that brilliant crossexamination will persuade a judge and a jury. Instead, they must have
information in documents, deposition transcripts, interrogatory
answers, admissions, or affidavits. 4 1
The cost implications are as large as they are obvious. As Judge
Diane P. Wood has explained, "[A]s it became ever more urgent to
amass, and then use, more supporting materials either to oppose or
support summary judgment, both costs and delays kept growing."42
This is no secret to the Bar, of course. During the public comment
period for the 2010 amendments to Rule 56, the Civil Rules Advisory
Committee consistently heard from lawyers that modern summaryjudgment practice was driving them to demand discovery that they
would not be pursuing otherwise. In a recent lawyer survey, nearly half
of the respondents stated their belief that discovery is used more to
develop evidence for summary judgment than to prepare for trial.4 3
Given the major impact that summary judgment has on the pretrial
process, one might expect it to be a major topic of discussion at the
case-planning stage. Our best sense, however, is that it is not. In many
cases, the summary judgment discussion-if there is one at all-is
limited to a brief exchange in which the judge and the parties talk about
39. See Wood, supra note 18, at 241, 243.
40. See id. at 240 (stating that after the Trilogy litigants "quickly learned that they had to
redouble their investment in discovery so they could present enough material to avert an untimely
demise of their cases").
41. D. Brock Hornby, Summary Judgment Without Illusions, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 273, 274
(2010).
42. Wood, supra note 18, at 241.
43. See ABA SURVEY, supra note 19, at 71 fig.6.1 1.
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the deadlines (including one for filing dispositive motions) that must be
set under Rule 16. Too often there is no serious discussion about what
motions might be filed. Too often there is no serious discussion about
the sequence or timing of any contemplated motions. And too often
there is no serious discussion about the relationship between those
motions and discovery. As a result, in too many cases the court and the
parties give no serious thought to, and have no meaningful conversation
about, the role that summary judgment might play in helping to shape or
guide the scope or timing of discovery.
We think that is a missed opportunity. Summary judgment should be
a central part of the Rule 16 discussion of the case in general and of
discovery management in particular. If a "live" (either in person or by
telephone or videoconferencing) Rule 16 conference is held, the judge
can ask the parties whether an early summary-judgment motion might
narrow the issues or even resolve the case entirely. 44 If so, then it might
make sense to focus discovery on the issues that would be raised in that
motion and to defer distinct discovery that might no longer be needed as
a result. The Rule 16 conference is also the right time for the court and
parties to start talking about motions that might be made later in the
pretrial process. That conversation can identify whether the discovery
needed for an early motion is distinct from the discovery needed for any
later motion and whether it makes sense to separate that work. It also
can help the parties identify the most important issues and then focus
discovery on the critical proof and the best means of obtaining it.
These discussions usually take only minutes. If the lawyers have
already thought about the likely motions and what discovery will be
needed for them-and especially if they have already talked to each
other about these matters as Rule 26(f) requires-it does not take much
time for them to tell the judge. In a conference devoted to the judge
working with the lawyers to figure out what pretrial work and schedule
makes sense for that case, it does not take long to discuss how to tailor
the timing and sequencing of summary-judgment motions and related
discovery. Amendments to the Federal Rules since the Trilogy have
paved the way for-indeed, have anticipated-those kinds of
discussions. Lawyers take their cues from the judges before whom they
appear. If the lawyers know that the judge will raise these issues at the
44. See ACTL/IAALS FINAL REPORT. supra note 19, at 22-23 (urging that parties and courts
talk about potential dispositive motions at the Rule 16 conference and then "give greater priority
to the resolution of motions that will advance the case more quickly to trial or resolution"); INST.
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYs.. CIVIL CASEFLOW MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES
17 (2009) [hereinafter CIVIL CASEFLOW MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES] ("Judges should discuss

potential dispositive motions at the initial pretrial conference.").

2012]

Managing Summary Judgment

529

Rule 16 conference and will be focused on a tailored case-management
plan, the lawyers will be prepared.
Before developing these points further, we think it important to
clarify that we are not advocating increased usage of summary
judgment. Nothing we suggest would alter the standards governing
summary judgment. Our concerns here are with timing and sequence.
Some motions are better made earlier in the suit than later. Some
motions should be made before other motions or before certain
discovery. Those are topics the parties should address at the early caseplanning stage. 4 5 We have no reason to believe that doing so will lead
to more motions, largely because we have no reason to believe that the
types of motions suitable for early attention are not currently being
brought. Rather, motions that could be dealt with earlier are just
brought later and rolled into an omnibus motion that addresses
everything. In fact, if we are correct, openly discussing how summary
judgment fits into the pretrial process will decrease the overall amount
of summary-judgment activity because it will eliminate many of the
end-of-suit motions that are currently being filed.
B. Using Summary-Judgment Planningto Narrow the Issues and Focus
Discovery
The strategic use of summary judgment can advance the overarching
goal of active case management by helping to focus the case on what
matters the most, which in turn streamlines the pretrial process and
avoids needless pretrial work and expense. Thinking of summary
judgment as a means of avoiding needless pretrialexpense departs from
the traditional notion expressed in Celotex that summary judgment is a
way of avoiding needless trial expense. But they are not exclusive.
Properly deployed, summary judgment can do both.
Active case management can be seen as performing two functions.
The first is to make sure that the pretrial activities remain within the
boundaries set by the claims and defenses that have been pleaded. The
scope of discovery, for example, is presumptively tied to the claims and
defenses asserted. 46 Active case management can keep discovery from
straying beyond those borders. But there is much more to case
management than border control. It will be the rare case in which
everything that could be done will need to be done, or should be done,
to resolve the case or prepare for trial. The second function of active
45. See SCHWARZER ET AL.. supra note 7. at 74-75 (emphasizing the need to discuss motion
timing to ensure that motions are filed neither too soon nor too late).
46. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(I).
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case management is to establish priorities within the boundaries set by
the claims and defenses. 4 7 Common sense tells us to begin with the
work most likely to yield the greatest benefits for the least effort. 48 The
Rule 26 requirement that courts limit discovery to what is proportional
to the needs of the case is but one way-though a critical way-in
which judges help the parties to set priorities and focus their efforts on
the most productive tasks first.4 9
The strategic use and scheduling of summary judgment can be an
important part of setting priorities in the case. The clearest example is
when there is an issue that stands out as potentially case-dispositive.
That issue might be an affirmative defense, a threshold issue for the
plaintiff, or a discrete and separable element of the plaintiffs case. An
obvious and recurring example is a qualified immunity defense that
could end the case entirely. 50 As a matter of common sense, the judge
and the parties should talk about whether it makes sense to focus on
potentially dispositive issues first given their potential to make other
issues in the case moot. 5 1 And as part of that conversation, the judge
and the parties should discuss whether discovery can be initially limited
to the issues to be raised by an early motion or whether it is more
efficient to conduct discovery more broadly even at the early stage.

47. In its simplest form, case management influences priority-setting indirectly by prompting
the parties to set their own priorities. For example, discovery deadlines and limits (e.g., no more
than ten depositions) do not directly set priorities, but they force the parties to set their own
priorities or risk running out of discovery options before they obtain the most important materials.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b) advisory committee's note (1983) ("Litigants are forced to establish
discovery priorities and thus to do the most important work first.").
48. See generally CIVIL LITIGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL, supra note 12. at 37-39
(discussing setting of discovery priorities and limits); SCHWARZER & HIRSCH, supra note 12, at
10 (same).
49. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C). While proportionality issues can come up during the
discovery process via motions to compel or motions for protective order, judges do not need to
wait until problems arise before getting involved. At the scheduling stage, courts can prioritize
discovery by ordering that it be conducted in phases or that certain sources be examined first. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(F).
50. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998) ("Rule 26 vests the trial judge with
broad discretion to tailor discovery narrowly and to dictate the sequence of discovery.").
51. See Rosenthal. supra note 11. at 241 (urging courts to have "live" Rule 16 casemanagement conferences and identifying as one of the benefits that "[t]he judge could explore
whether it was appropriate to stage discovery in relation to motions that could narrow the issues
and therefore reduce the amount and expense of discovery required"); William W. Schwarzer.
Summary Judgment and Case Management, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 213, 221 (1987) ("The proper
approach is to define issues that may be susceptible to disposition by motion as early as possible
and then to conduct the discovery necessary to make the record. Both sides should target their
discovery to that end, although their respective discovery targets may not necessarily be the
same.").
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The judge and the parties should also discuss whether the strategic
use of targeted early summary-judgment motions can help narrow the
scope of pretrial work. For example, although motions for partial
summary judgment are by their nature not case-dispositive, they
certainly can narrow the scope of the case, eliminate the need for
discovery on specific issues, and focus the parties' efforts going
forward. To return to the qualified immunity example, a motion for
partial summary judgment that resolved some or all of the claims
against one or more individual defendants would substantially narrow
and focus the rest of the case even if other claims remained against
those defendants or other defendants.
An early partial summary
judgment resolving certain claims can also eliminate the need for
discovery into issues that are moot as a result.
In many cases, the discussion will lead to the conclusion that early
summary-judgment motions would not be appropriate or feasible. At
times some discovery is needed before the parties can be precise about
what issues are appropriate for early summary-judgment motions. And
sometimes there is no way to carve out key issues and address them
separately. But that information is itself valuable. First, it may avoid
an ill-advised early motion that would simply have led the other side to
seek a Rule 56(d) continuance and led the judge to deny the motion or
defer consideration pending the needed discovery. 52 Second, if the
judge knows what motions are likely to be filed later in the case, the
judge can use that information to establish a proportional discovery plan
because the parties will have identified, at least provisionally, some of
the key disputed proof issues and the legal contexts in which they will
be raised.
While the need to set pretrial priorities is not new, the advent of
electronic discovery makes it even more important for judges to help
parties establish discovery priorities. Unchecked and unmanaged,
electronic discovery can quickly exceed all boundaries of
proportionality. The judge should require the parties to focus on
identifying what electronically stored information ("ESI") is likely to be
important to the contested issues in the case and where that information
can most easily be obtained. If summary judgment motions are
expected, the judge and the parties should discuss the best timing for
those motions and develop a discovery plan designed to focus discovery

52. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(d) (formerly Rule 56(f)). For a discussion of practice under Rule
56(d). see 1 STEVEN S. GENSLER. FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: RULES AND
COMMENTARY 968-71 (2011); 11 JAMES WM. MOORE. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §§
56.100-.104 (3d ed. 2011).
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on the right issues at the right time. If the parties cannot agree on how
to do that, the dispute will be identified early and can be resolved before
discovery, and therefore all progress in the case, grinds to a halt.
Recent work by the Northern District of Illinois and The Sedona
Conference, among others, provides valuable guidance for linking early,
detailed planning for what summary judgment motions will be filed, and
when, to the discovery-especially electronic discovery-that will be
required. 5 3
We are far from the first commentators to link summary judgment
and case management. Indeed, the idea of using summary judgment to
narrow the issues and focus discovery traces back to the earliest days of
the case-management movement. A brief summary of the history serves
as a good reminder of the benefits that summary-judgment planning
yields.
The federal courts first began looking into case management as a way
of dealing with what were then called "protracted" cases. That study
led to the publication of the Handbook of Recommended Procedures for
the Trial of Protracted Cases (the "Handbook"). 54 It was a trailblazing
work that proclaimed the need for active case management by a judge
specifically assigned to the case. 55 The Handbook recommended that
discovery "be confined to the genuine issues necessary to a decision of
the case" and noted that discussions at an early pretrial conference
could, together with targeted summary-judgment motions, help to
identify the "necessary" issues. 5 6 Nine years later, the newly created
Federal Judicial Center published the Manual for Complex and
Multidistrict Litigation ("MCML"), which built upon but superseded the
Handbook. 57 As the following passage illustrates, the MCML even
more clearly embraced the idea of using early dispositive motions to
focus discovery:
53.
OF

See SEVENTH CIR. ELEC. DISCOVERY COMM., PRINCIPLES RELATING TO THE DISCOVERY
ELECTRONICALLY
STORED
INFORMATION
§ 2.01(a) (2010). available at

http://www.discoverypilot.com/sites/default/files/Principles8_10.pdf
(emphasizing need for
lawyers to plan for discovery to achieve proportionality and discussing tactic of conducting
discovery in phases): THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES ADDRESSING
ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION, at ii (2007) (emphasizing importance of early
communication to ensure proportionality).
54. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE STUDY GRP. ON PROTRACTED LITIG.. HANDBOOK OF
RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR THE TRIAL OF PROTRACTED CASES 23-24 (1960) [hereinafter
HANDBOOK FOR PROTRACTED CASES].

55. Id. at 27.
56. See id. at 38 & n.43.
57. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX AND MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 6 (1970) (discussing the
contributions of numerous federal judges who volunteered "to process masses of multidistrict
litigation").
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In some complex cases it becomes apparent at the preliminary pretrial
conference or shortly thereafter that the determination of a legal question will expedite the disposition of the case. This is particularly the
case where the nature and scope of discovery and further pretrial proceedings would be substantially affected by the determination of the
preliminary legal question . .

.

. When desirable to expedite the cause,

the court should provide an efficient method including discovery if
desirable, and a time schedule for submission and determination of
such preliminary legal questions.5 8
Over the last several decades, the FJC has updated and revised the

MCML several times. The most current version is the Manual for
Complex Litigation (Fourth) ("MCL 4th"). 59 The MCL 4th continues
the tradition of prompting judges to think about how and when to utilize
summary judgment to achieve overall case management goals. In a
section specifically addressed to summary judgment, the MCL 4th
advises as follows: "To avoid pretrial activities that may be unnecessary
if the summary-judgment motion is granted, the schedule should call for
the filing of the motion as early in the litigation as possible." 6 0
From its origins in complex cases, the case-management movement
went mainstream in the early 1980s as judges increasingly recognized
that the practices used to manage complex cases could be applied across
the docket. 6 1 The idea of integrating summary-judgment planning with
discovery planning started to appear in case-management guides written
for "ordinary" cases. In part, this expansion reflected the recognition
that "ordinary" cases can be every bit as contentious as "complex"
cases. It also reflected the reality that excessive and obstructionist
discovery knows no case-category boundaries.

58. Id. § 1.8, at 26 27.
59. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) Xvii (2004) [hereinafter MCL 4th]
("The fourth edition of the Manual is adapted to new conditions and demands of federal
litigation.").
60. Id. § 11.34, at 47. In discussing how summary-judgment motions avoid unnecessary
pretrial activities, the MCL 4th explained that "[s]ummary judgment may eliminate the need for
further proceedings or at least reduce the scope of discovery or trial. Even if denied, the parties'
formulations of their positions may help clarify and define issues and the scope of further
discovery." Id § 11.34, at 46.
61. See E. Donald Elliott. ManagerialJudging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 306, 308-09 (1986) (describing the development of managerial judging); Richard L.
Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospectsfor ProceduralProgress, 59 BROOK. L. REV.
761, 790-91 (1993) (same). Some people predicted this development from the start. Judge
Alfred P. Murrah, the driving force behind the Handbook, presciently concluded his Foreword
with the following comment: "This Handbook has been designed for use in protracted cases, but
is not limited to use therein. One cannot escape the clear application of the principles enunciated
herein to the average case as well as to the protracted case." HANDBOOK FOR PROTRACTED
CASES, supranote 54, at 7.
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In 1991, the FJC published a pamphlet titled "The Elements of Case
Management." One of the authors was Judge William Schwarzer, then
the Director of the FJC and an early evangelist for active judicial case
management. Judge Schwarzer viewed the initial pretrial conference as
a "moment of truth" for the case, when the court and the parties could
identify the "pivotal issues" and then design a pretrial plan around
them. 62 He recognized that discovery management and summaryjudgment management were complementary pieces of the puzzle:
Careful definition of issues at the outset may also disclose issues susceptible to resolution by summary or partial summary judgment. Discussion can reveal some threshold legal issues that may not have ap-

peared clearly to the lawyers or perhaps was swept under the rug by
one of them.o
Importantly, Judge Schwarzer also recognized the value of planning for
the dispositive motions that would be filed later. He explained that
"[t]he conference not only lays the groundwork for motions, it also
serves to identify the discovery needed before motions can be made,
thereby avoiding premature motions and building the foundation for
proper ones." 64 All of these passages appear verbatim in the "pocket
guide" Second Edition published in 2006.65
The suggestion that judges discuss summary judgment at the initial
pretrial conference was also featured prominently in a monograph on
summary judgment that Judge Schwarzer co-wrote for the FJC. 66 The
connection is most clearly made in this passage:
Rule 16 and pretrial conferences can help accomplish numerous goals
germane to the effective use of summary judgment motions. First,
they may clarify which issues are suited for a summary judgment motion and what factual basis will be needed to decide the motion. This,
in turn, will enable the parties to conduct discovery with more precision and economy (and give the court a better basis for ensuring that
this is done). Indeed, the parties can agree on various cooperative
measures that will make discovery quicker and less expensive. Moreover, this process will sometimes clarify that there are genuine factual
disputes and thus save the parties and the court the time and expense
of preparing and considering summary judgment motions. In other
cases it may hasten the recognition that summary judgment should be

62. WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER & ALAN HIRSCH, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE ELEMENTS OF
CASE MANAGEMENT 4 (1991).
63. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 7.
65. See SCHWARZER & HIRSCH, supra note 12, at 6.
66. See SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 7, at 73-74.
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sought and thus prevent superfluous discovery and other pretrial activity.
Finally, the United States Judicial Conference itself has lauded the
benefits of integrating summary-judgment management into case
management. The Judicial Conference's Court Administration and
Case Management Committee published the first edition of its "Civil
Litigation Management Manual" ("CLMM") in 2001.68 The CLMM
advised judges to use the initial case-management conference as a
forum for identifying and narrowing the issues. 6 9 In that vein, it
suggested that judges engage the parties to determine whether any
issues might be resolved by partial summary judgment and then put
discovery targeted at those issues on an expedited track. 70 The CLMM
emphasized the importance of scheduling the filing of summary
judgment motions "for the appropriate time in the litigation."71
Acknowledging an inherent tension that cannot be resolved by any
generally applicable rule, but instead requires an informed case-specific
determination, the CLMM states: "Summary judgment motions should
be filed at the optimum time. Motions filed prematurely can be a waste
of time and effort, yet motions deferred until shortly before trial can
result in much avoidable litigation effort." 72 A second edition of the
CLMM, published in 2010, reiterates these suggestions. 73
The
74
Benchbook used by federal-court trial judges
is currently being
revised to include, for the first time, a chapter on pretrial case
management, which also will highlight how judges can coordinate
motions management and discovery management to avoid unnecessary
pretrial work and expense.
C. Summary-Judgment Planningand Settlement
So far, we have focused on how the strategic use of targeted
summary judgment can avoid pretrial work and expense by eliminating
issues early and narrowing discovery. But it also can affect settlement,
particularly timing. The timing of settlement directly and obviously

67. Id. at 73 n.309.
68. See COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. & CASE MGMT.. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S..
CIVIL LITIGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL, at iii (2001).

69. Id. at 21.
70. Id. at 22.
71. Id. at 48.
72. Id.
73. See CIVIL LITIGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL, supra note 12, at 27, 57.
74.

See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES (5th ed. 2007).

The Sixth Edition is expected to be completed sometime in 2012.
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affects pretrial work, cost, and delay. The sooner a case settles, the
more litigation expense is avoided.
It is probably true that nothing avoids more litigation expense than
settlement. Like a summary judgment grant, a settlement before trial
avoids the cost of a trial. It is a well-known statistic that fewer than 2%
of federal civil cases filed terminate in a trial. 7 5 What happens to the
other 98%? One careful study suggests that about 67% of filed federal

civil cases end in a settlement. 76 So settlement avoids roughly twothirds of all potential civil trials.
While the number of cases that settle is important to avoiding
litigation expense, so too is the timing of those settlements. A
settlement after all discovery is done (fact and expert) and after a full
round of fully briefed summary-judgment motions is resolved will save
the cost of trial, but only after all the costs of pretrial work have been
incurred. We break no new ground in pointing out that the earlier a case
settles, the greater the savings to the court and the parties. 77 That is a
major reason why courts often direct parties to take part in activities
designed to foster early settlements, like early settlement conferences,
early mediation, and Early Neutral Evaluation. 78
75. See Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919. 1958
fig.3 (2009). In 2010, the trial rate dropped to one percent. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, at tbl.C-4 (2010), available at

http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/2010/dec10/
CO4Decl0.pdf.
76. See Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate and Why
Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111. 115 (2009) (describing data from 2001-02
civil cases in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the Northern District of Georgia). It is
important to emphasize that this is an aggregate figure. The settlement rate varied between
districts and varied dramatically across case categories. See id. at 131-33. This study also
emphasizes that the settlement rate one identifies depends significantly on which case outcomes
are deemed to be settlements (the numerator) and whether one includes in the rate calculation
cases that were "resolved" in that court but that had no definitive outcome (the denominator). See
id. at 129-31. Professor Kevin Clermont has also identified a settlement rate of about 67%.
subject to the same caveats about coding and definitions. See Clermont, supra note 75, at 195455.
77. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note (1983) ("Since it obviously eases
crowded court dockets and results in savings to the litigants and the judicial system, settlement
should be facilitated at as early a stage of the litigation as possible."); see also CIVIL LITIGATION
MANAGEMENT MANUAL, supra note 12, at 90 (noting that one of the optimal points in a lawsuit
to raise the possibility of settlement is early in the suit when "no discovery has yet occurred and
the cost savings are significant").
78.

See WAYNE D. BRAZIL, EFFECTIVE APPROACHES TO SETTLEMENT:

A HANDBOOK FOR

LAWYERS AND JUDGES 141 (1988) ("Consider initiating settlement conferences early in the life
of the case. Early in the case, money that otherwise would be spent on discovery, motions, and
pretrial can be available for the settlement fund."): Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy Welsh. CourtConnected General Civil ADR Programs: Aiming for Institutionalization,Efficient Resolution,
and the Experience of Justice, in ADR HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES 18 (Donna Stienstra & Susan M.
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The literature exploring the dynamics of settlement is vast, and it has
identified many factors that influence settlement. 79 One factor everyone
agrees is important is information. Parties bargain in the shadow of
expected legal outcomes.8 0 Outcome assessments require information,
and one of the most important pieces of information a party can obtain
is whether any particular claim or defense will survive for trial.8 1 The
sooner the parties have that information, the sooner they can use it to
make more informed predictions about likely trial outcomes. 82
Summary-judgment rulings that do not dispose of a case in its
entirety can facilitate an early settlement in many ways.
The
elimination of part of a case by granting a motion for partial summary
judgment can have an enormous impact on crystallizing the trial value
of a case. But so too can the denial of an early summary-judgment
motion. 83 If nothing else, the denial of the motion provides the parties
with new information-in this instance, that the judge believes the
claim or defense warrants a trial-that parties find very important in the
Yates eds., 2004) (discussing relationship between timing and avoiding discovery and other
pretrial expenses); ROBERT J. NIEMIC, DONNA STIENSTRA & RANDALL E. RAVITZ, FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., GUIDE TO JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF CASES IN ADR 13-15 (2001) (noting that
initial view that referral should wait until discovery is over has now given way to the view that in
many cases early referral is better to avoid pretrial expense and position entrenchment);
ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & DONNA STIENSTRA, ADR AND SETTLEMENT IN THE FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURTS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS 8 ("[W]hereas in the past many
considered ADR appropriate only for trial-ready cases, now ADR is more often integrated into a
court or judge's overall case management practices and is considered much earlier in the case.").
79. See Stewart J. Schwab & Michael Heise. Splitting Logs: An Empirical Perspective on
Employment DiscriminationSettlements, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 931, 936-38 (2011) (providing a
compact literature review of the factors that influence settlement decisions). For additional
discussion of the economic determinants of settlement, see Daniel P. Kessler & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, Empirical Study of the Civil Justice System, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 343, 381-83 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
80. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputesfor Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1. 9 (1984) (discussing process of estimating case outcomes); Schwab & Heise,
supra note 79, at 937 (noting that disparate settlement theories "share common conceptual ground
insofar as litigants' assessments of their legal exposure inform their bargaining positions").
81. See Schneider. supra note 29, at 716 ("[W]hen summary judgment is denied, lawyers and
judges report that defendants immediately offer to settle. often with far more generous offers than
they might have otherwise considered.").
82. See Schwab & Heise. supra note 79, at 938 ("To the extent that the disposal of an
important motion (or motions) during the pretrial stage reduces the uncertainty surrounding a
trial's outcome, ambiguity aversion theory might account for an increase in settlement activity
after a court decides a critical motion."); Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 76, at 113-14 (noting
that pretrial motion practice also provides litigants with information that informs settlement
decisions).
83. See CIVIL CASEFLOW MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 44, at 16 ("[C]ases often
proceed toward a quick settlement after a dispositive motion is denied."); WILLGING & LEE, IN
THEIR WORDS, supra note 20. at 32-33 (noting that summary judgment often serves as a catalyst
for settlement, but sometimes as an obstacle because of sunk costs).
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pricing of claims. 84 In addition, the summary-judgment process itself
tends to organize the issues and the proof in ways that enhance the
parties' abilities to assess the strengths and weaknesses of their cases. 8 5
According to one recent study, the filing of substantive motions (like
summary-judgment motions) has a "propelling effect" of accelerating
settlement timing, a finding the study attributes to the fact that both the
making of the motion and the court's ruling "unlock[] information that
the parties and the court otherwise would not share with each other." 8 6
This theory may help to explain the finding that 57% of summaryjudgment motions are never ruled on. 87 Sometimes this is because the
case proceeds to trial without any ruling. But that figure also captures
cases the parties settle while the motion is pending, perhaps because the
motion draws out the real issues and the available proof in a way that
allows the parties to refine their case valuations, and perhaps to avoid
the risk of the valuation change that will result from whatever the court
decides.
By discussing how the strategic use of early summary-judgment
motions can facilitate settlement, we are not taking a pro-settlement
position. (We are not taking an anti-settlement position either.88 ) The
issue is not whether parties will seek summary judgment. Nor is it
whether the parties' settlement positions will be influenced by the
court's rulings. It is simply an issue of timing. It is inevitable that the
parties will learn which of the claims and defenses that have been
asserted will survive for trial. To the extent some of that information
can be made available earlier in the litigation, it can accelerate the

84. See Rave, supra note 24, at 894-95.
85. See Edward Brunet, Six Summary Judgment Safeguards, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1165, 1167
(2010) (arguing that the summary-judgment process increases the chances of settlement); Hornby,
supra note 41. at 276 n.9 ("Summary judgment preparation also provides thorough information to
both sides that may prompt settlement even when summary judgment is denied."); Jonathan T.
Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 44 (2003) ("[E]ven in
the course of explaining why a trial is necessary. a decision denying summary judgment (or
granting partial summary judgment) can put nonissues to one side and induce the parties to
address only those aspects of the case that present a genuine issue of material fact.").
86. Christina L. Boyd & David A. Hoffman, Litigating Toward Settlement 25 (Jan. 13, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
87. CECIL & CORT, supra note 34, at 8 tbl.3; see also Cecil et al., supra note 3, at 862 n.57
(discussing possible reasons for absence of a ruling on the motion).
88. See Clermont. supra note 75, at 1951-53 (discussing the critical need settlement fills for
parties and the system). For more on the costs and benefits of settlement, see Symposium,
Against Settlement: Twenty-Five Years Later, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1117, 1118 (2009).
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settlement process to a point where the parties may be able to avoid
some of the discovery expense. 89
It is more difficult to garner empirical support for the proposition that
the terms on which cases settle is improved by well-planned and welltimed summary-judgment motions, but our intuition leads us to that
conclusion. Parties need information to accurately value the strengths
and weaknesses of their claims. But most parties are sensitive to the
cost of obtaining that information. As the cost of the pretrial process
rises, so too does the probability the terms of the settlement will be
affected by the desire to avoid pretrial expense. A more focused and
less expensive pretrial process should reduce the impact of litigation
expense as a factor-a distorting factor-in the pricing of claims.
D. Summary-Judgment Planning Under the Civil Rules
We now turn to how the current structure of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure accommodates-we might even say encourages-early
summary-judgment planning.
Rulemaking activity in the years
following the Trilogy sent a clear message that summary-judgment
practice should be integrated into active case management in order to
narrow the issues in the case during the run of pretrial activity.
Amendments to Rule 16 specifically added summary-judgment
planning to the list of potential agenda items for case-management
discussions among counsel, conferences with the court, and court
orders. But equally instructive are recent amendments to Rule 56 that
culminate a longstanding vision for a restructured Rule 56 that would
more obviously and directly facilitate using summary judgment as a
case-management tool.
In 1983, Rule 16 was transformed from a rule principally governing
trial preparation to one principally governing pretrial case
management. 90 The 1983 version of Rule 16 alerted parties and judges
to the idea of using the pretrial conference process to streamline the
issues and discovery, 9 1 but it made no specific reference to summary

89. See WILLGING & LEE, IN THEIR WORDS. supra note 20. at 29 ("Because discovery
generally precedes summary judgment, in most cases interviewees say they have already invested
most of the cost of litigating the case before a motion for summary judgment is filed.").
90. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a) advisory committee's note (1983) ("The amended rule makes
scheduling and case management an express goal of pretrial procedure. This is done in Rule
16(a) by shifting the emphasis away from a conference focused solely on the trial and toward a
process of judicial management that embraces the entire pretrial phase, especially motions and
discovery."). See generally Gensler, supra note 9, at 676-79 (discussing impact of the 1983
amendments).

91.

FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(1), (4) (1983).
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judgment.9 2 That changed with the 1993 version, which included a new
subsection directing courts and parties to consider "the appropriateness
and timing of summary adjudication under Rule 56."93 The Committee
Note explained that the reference to summary judgment was added "in
recognition that use of Rule 56 to avoid or reduce the scope of trial is a
topic that can, and often should, be considered at a pretrial
conference." 9 4 More to our point, the Committee Note hinted at using
the scheduling conference to identify claims and issues that would be
susceptible to early motions, saying: "Often, however, the potential use
of Rule 56 is a matter that arises from discussions during a conference.
The court may then call for motions to be filed."9 5
The post-Trilogy rulemaking activity on Rule 56 makes the linkage
between summary-judgment management and case management even
more clear. The trail begins in the late 1980s, when the Advisory
Committee began considering amendments to Rule 56.96 After one
false start, 97 the Advisory Committee proposed an amendment that
would have overhauled Rule 56. In large part it was an attempt to
codify the Trilogy in new rule text. 98 But it was also clearly directed at
emphasizing the use of summary judgment as a comprehensive casemanagement tool. Mechanically, it did that by explicitly authorizing
claim-specific and even issue-specific motions 99 and by authorizing the
court to initiate summary judgment through a "show cause"
mechanism. 0 0 Thematically, the Advisory Committee made explicit

92. The only mention of summary judgment was in the Committee Note discussing the court's
power under Rule 16(c)(1) to eliminate frivolous claims and defenses, which emphasized that the
court need not await a formal summary-judgment motion before taking that step. FED. R. Civ. P.
16(c) advisory committee's note (1983).
93. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(5) (1993).
94. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c) advisory committee's note (1993).
95. Id.
96. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, MINUTES, APRIL 27 29, 1989, at 50-51
(1989) (discussing review of draft).
97. The Advisory Committee published an initial amendment proposal in 1989 but, in light of
the comments received, elected to rework the proposal rather than present it to the Standing
Committee for approval. See REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE
STANDING COMNMITTEE, JUNE 19, 1990. at 1 (1990) [hereinafter JUNE 1990 CIVIL RULES
REPORT] ("[T]he amendments to Rules 30 and 56, have been temporarily withdrawn pending
further reconsideration.").
98. See REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE STANDING COMMITTEE
ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE. MAY 1. 1992. at 124 (1992). available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesandPolicies/rules/Reports/CV5-1992.pdf (explaining that
the revisions would have restated the summary-judgment standard as it "has been developed
through case law").
99. Id. at 119 (proposed FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)).
100. Id. at 124 (proposed FED. R. CIV. P. 56(g)).
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the interrelationship between summary adjudication and controlling
pretrial costs. The very first sentence of the proposed accompanying
Committee Note read, "This revision is intended to enhance the utility
of summary judgment procedure as a means to avoid the time and
expense of discovery, preparation for trial, and trial itself as to matters
that ... can have but one outcome." 10 1 A later passage in the proposed
Committee Note was even more direct: "A primary benefit of summary
adjudication is elimination of ultimately wasteful discovery and other
preparation for trial."1 02 Moreover, the proposed Committee Note
linked this function with Rule 16 and active case management,
identifying the scheduling conference as an opportune moment "to
focus early discovery on potentially dispositive motions" and clarifying
that judges might invoke the new "show cause" provision in light of the
discussion of the merits at the conference.1 0 3
The proposed amendment was voted down, but for reasons related to
the statement of the standard for summary judgment, not because of any
philosophical opposition to linking summary judgment with case
management.1 04 It bears noting that the 1993 amendments to Rule 16
described above-which were enacted-were part of the same package
of proposed amendments. Viewed in that light, there can be little doubt
that the rulemakers envisioned a much more robust interplay between
early case management and summary judgment targeted at narrowing
the case early enough to avoid needless discovery.
That vision was realized in the 2010 amendments to Rule 56. Like
the 1992 proposal, the 2010 version of Rule 56 specifically authorizes
"partial summary judgment" in the form of both claim-specific and
issue-specific motions.1 05 The 2010 version also explicitly authorizes
judges to raise the prospect of summary judgment sua sponte.10 6 The
Committee Note to the 2010 amendments does not expressly link Rule
56 and Rule 16.107 But as participants in the rulemaking process that
led to the 2010 amendment to Rule 56, we can confirm that this linkage
was very much in mind. In particular, the explicit recognition of issue101. Id. (proposed FED. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee's note) (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 126 (proposed FED. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee's note).
103. Id. at 129 (proposed FED. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee's note).
104. See Steven S. Gensler, Must, Should, Shall, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1139. 1152 (2010)
(discussing history of the failed 1992 summary judgment amendments).
105. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
106. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(f)(3).
107. That linkage is made in the Committee Note accompanying the 2009 amendments
creating new default timing provisions for summary-judgment motions. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56
advisory committee's notes (2009) (discussing how courts and parties may adjust the timing of
summary-judgment motions to the needs of the case).
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specific motions and sua sponte consideration were intended to enhance
the utility of Rule 56 as a means for narrowing the scope of the case
earlier in the pretrial process in order to focus discovery.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the benefits of case
management generally and of summary-judgment management
specifically.
In 1989, the Court stated that "[olne of the most
significant insights that skilled trial judges have gained in recent years is
the wisdom and necessity for early judicial intervention in the
management of litigation." 0 8 Early statements focused on the need for
judges to manage discovery to minimize cost and burden. 109 Later, the
court expanded the discussion to bring in summary judgment and
explain the value of an integrated case management approach that
manages discovery and summary judgment together:
The trial judge can therefore manage the discovery process to facilitate
prompt and efficient resolution of the lawsuit; as the evidence is gathered, the defendant-official may move for partial summary judgment
on objective issues that are potentially dispositive and are more amenable to summary disposition than disputes about the official's intent,
which frequently turn on credibility assessments. Of course, the judge
should give priority to discovery concerning the issues that bear upon
the qualified immunity defense, such as the actions that the official actually took, since that defense should be resolved as early as possible.1 10

Now more than ever, it is important to remember that the Supreme
Court once spoke favorably about the ability of judges to control
discovery through active case management. In two recent pleadings
cases, Twombly and Jqbal, the majority opinions took an unexpectedly
skeptical stance.' 11 Perhaps the Court now embraces the view that case
management is doomed to fail because judges lack the information they
need to mark the boundaries of the case and to set priorities.11 2 But it is

108. Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 171 (1989).
109. See Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522. 546
(1987) ("Judicial supervision of discovery should always seek to minimize its costs and
inconvenience and to prevent improper uses of discovery requests.").
110. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 599 (1998).
111. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937. 1953 (2009) (rejecting argument that "carefulcase-management" controls discovery sufficient to allow relaxed pleadings requirements); Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) ("[T]he success of judicial supervision in
checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side.").
112. See Frank Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 638-39 (1989)
(asserting the view that judges cannot manage discovery because they lack the information to
distinguish between "good" discovery and "bad" discovery): see also Robert G. Bone, Twombly,
Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access. 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 899-900 (2009)
("The Twombly Court's skepticism is in fact well justified.... Judges face information and other
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equally plausible (no pun intended) that this skepticism reflects a sense
that trial judges too often have failed to use the active case-management
tools and practices that the Court once praised. This second explanation
is far less pessimistic and, in our view, much more realistic in light of
the Court's prior statements.
E. GettingJudges andPartiesto Talk About Summary Judgment
As the preceding sections detail, the idea of incorporating summary
judgment into a comprehensive case-management strategy is firmly
established in all aspects of the case-management movement. It was a
part of the case management vision that emerged from early thinking
about how to deal with complex cases. It has been a fixture of the
institutional judiciary's publications on case management. It has been
incorporated into the applicable Federal Rules. And it has been
favorably discussed by the Supreme Court. With all of that support, we
might expect that early summary-judgment management would, by
now, be a ubiquitous part of federal civil pretrial practice. But that has
not happened, at least as far as we can tell.1 13 Why not? And what, if
anything, can be done to change that?
The first obstacle to the process we have been describing is that its
success depends initially on the success of the active judicial casemanagement movement overall. Though it is not impossible, we very
much doubt that there are many judges who eschew early active case
management generally but then specifically engage in active summaryjudgment planning. So a crucial predicate to our proposal is to
determine the extent to which federal judges generally implement the
active case-management model. That is itself a complicated question.
First, it is a small but critical detail to point out that Rule 16 never
requires a judge to hold a case-management conference of any kind.
What Rule 16 requires is that the judge issue a scheduling order setting
deadlines for joining parties, amending the pleadings, completing
discovery, and filing motions. 114 The judge must get input from the
parties but can forego any kind of "live" conference (whether conducted
constraints that impair their ability to manage optimally .
)...
); Redish, supra note 31, at 603-04
(arguing that proportionality limits are impractical because the trial court is not in a good position
to assess whether the desired information is worth the cost). We do not share this view.
See
Gensler, supra note 9, at 692-93; Rosenthal, supra note 11, at 240-41.
113. We must begin with an acknowledgment. We do not have empirical data specifically
addressing the extent to which judges are engaging in summary-judgment planning as part of the
case-management process. To our knowledge, no empirical study has ever sought to gather that
precise data. As discussed herein. however, all of the information we do have points toward the
conclusion that most judges are not engaging in active summary-judgment management.
114. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(1), (3)(A).
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in person or by telephone or videconference) and instead rely on the
parties' Rule 26(f) report or other submissions. 115 Moreover, even if
the court holds a live conference, Rule 16 does not dictate what is
discussed. Rule 16 creates a vast authority for judges to actively
manage if they choose to, but it requires very little. 116 Judges have near
plenary autonomy to determine how much or how little active case
management to do in any case. As Professor Richard Marcus noted
when the Civil Rules were first amended in 1983 to add case
management to the pretrial process, the success of the case-management
model ultimately "depends on wide acceptance of the tenor, not just the
letter, of the proposed amendments." 1 1 7
The available evidence indicates that case-management practices
continue to vary widely among federal judges. We are not aware of any
existing empirical data on how often federal judges hold "active" early
case-management conferences.1 18 Some data is available on what may
be seen as proxy issues. In one recent survey of federal-court discovery
practices, for example, lawyers reported that the judge held a conference
to discuss a discovery plan in fewer than half of the cases involved in
that study. 119 That data is consistent with (but does not specifically
confirm) our own experience that many judges do not have a conference
to engage the parties at an early stage. Instead, many judges rely on the
papers then on file and limit the Rule 16 order to setting the required
deadlines and perhaps a deadline for filing the joint pretrial order and
dates for holding docket call or trial. 12 0 In short, in many cases, the

115. FED. R. CIv. P. 16(b)(1).
116. See Rosenthal, supra note 11. at 238-41 (discussing what Rule 16 requires versus what
Rule 16 allows). See generally GENSLER, supra note 52. at 312 ("Rule 16 is deliberately crafted
to empower rather than dictate. It identifies various goals that can be achieved by active case
management and sets forth a comprehensive list of subjects that might profitably be addressed
through case management. But whether to pursue these case management techniques in any
particular case, and how aggressively to do so, is left to the individual judge.").
117. Richard L. Marcus. Reducing Court Costs and Delay: The Potential Impact of the
ProposedAmendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 66 JUDICATURE 363, 370 (1983).
118. That will have changed by the time this Article is published. In January 2012, the
Federal Judicial Center conducted a closed-case survey asking lawyers about the casemanagement practices they encountered in the early stages of those cases. The survey is titled
"Early Stages of Litigation Survey." The Federal Judicial Center's report is expected to be
available sometime later this spring. Unofficially, the early returns are fully consistent with our
assessment of current practice.
119. See LEE & WILLGING. supra note 38. at 13 fig.4. It should be noted that the case
population in that study was limited to cases where discovery was expected to occur, excluding
cases that closed before 60 days and cases in categories where discovery is not likely (e.g., social
security appeals). Id. at 77. In other words, lawyers in half of the cases where discovery was
expected were still reporting that the judge did not hold a conference to discuss a discovery plan.
120. See Rosenthal, supra note II, at 241.
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reason the judge and the parties are not talking about summaryjudgment planning early in the case is because the judge and the parties
are not talking at all.121
That being said, we think the problem goes beyond whether or not
the judge engages in active case management. We suspect that even
among the judges who do more actively manage their cases, including
holding some kind of "live" Rule 16 conference, many do not include
active summary-judgment planning in that process.1 22 Part of the
problem is that summary judgment has been typecast. The idea that
summary judgment is a post-discovery mechanism used to determine
whether any of the claims can survive for trial is deeply ingrained. It is
the role described by the Supreme Court in what is arguably its most
famous summary-judgment decision, Celotex. 123 It is also the role
featured in the 1963 Committee Note to Rule 56, which states that
"[the very mission of the summary judgment procedure is to pierce the
pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a
genuine need for trial."l 2 4 We do not think these statements were
intended to confine summary judgment to the post-discovery realm. We
are certain that neither the Court nor the Advisory Committee intended
to send the message that there is a "summary judgment stage" of
litigation that only falls between discovery and trial. But taken in
isolation, it is easy to see how statements like those might create just
that impression. In short, part of the problem may simply be that the
campaign to demonstrate how summary judgment can avoid
unnecessary trials may have been too effective, and in the process
obscured, and possibly undercut, how summary judgment can be used
to plan the pretrial work as well.
It may also be that, for some judges, the type of summary-judgment
planning we have described is simply a bridge too far. Active case
management is not a monolithic enterprise. The range of activities that
are a part of active case management extends from setting pretrial
deadlines to addressing complicated electronic discovery issues.12 5
Individual judges will have their own views about what types of

121. For a thorough-and we hope compelling discussion of why federal judges should be
embracing the active-judicial-case-management model, see Steven S. Gensler & Lee H.
Rosenthal, Sixteen Reasons Why (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
122. Here too, we are not aware of any empirical data on this point, and the January 2012
Early Stages of Litigation Survey, supranote 118, does not address it.
123. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
124. FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee's note (1963).
125. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b) (scheduling of basic deadlines); FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)
(discussing other matters that can be raised at pretrial conferences).
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activities they are comfortable getting involved with.12 6 It may be that
some judges who engage in some forms of active case management
view active summary-judgment planning as straying too far from the
traditional judicial role of only resolving motions as conceived and
brought by the parties.127
Lawyers may also feel like they are getting mixed signals about
whether early summary judgment motions are welcome or advisable.
Some districts, for example, have local rules limiting parties to filing a
single summary-judgment motion absent leave of court. 12 8 The primary
purposes of this type of rule, as we understand it, are to prevent endruns around page limits, to reduce the risk that wealthy litigants will use
multiple motion rounds to impose expense on their less-wealthy
opponents, and to avoid unnecessary burdens on the judge. Those are
unquestionably legitimate goals. But the practical effect of "omnibus
motion" rules is to push summary-judgment motions towards the postdiscovery period when the would-be movant will be in a position to
make the most comprehensive motion possible. It is true that a party
could make an early, targeted motion and then seek leave to file a later
motion on other matters, but the far less risky path is to forego the early,
targeted motion and include those grounds in the omnibus motion later.
In districts with no such rule, lawyers nonetheless may be reluctant, for
a variety of reasons, to take the initiative in filing an early summaryjudgment motion and seeking to limit discovery to that necessary for the
issues raised in the motion when the judge has not indicated any interest
in pursuing that path.
It should be clear at this point that with summary-judgment motions,
as with most things, timing is critical. 129 The last thing judges want to
do is to encourage premature summary-judgment motions. Rule 56(d)
provides a mechanism to address a motion that is prematurely filed, 1 3 0

126. See SCHWARZER & HIRSCH, supra note 12. at 1 ("Case management means different
things to different people, and there is no single correct method.").
127. See Molot, supra note 85, at 44-45 (hypothesizing that summary-judgment practice is a
less controversial form of case management because the judge is generally in a reactive posture,
relying on the parties to file motions).
128. See, e.g., W.D. OKLA. L. Cv. R. 56.1 ("Absent leave of Court, a party may file only one
motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56."); N.D. TEX. L. Cv. R. 56.2(b) ("Unless otherwise directed by
the presiding judge. or permitted by law, a party may file no more than one motion for summary
judgment.").
129.

See CIVIL LITIGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL, supra note 12, at 56 (stating that many

motions should not be filed until after discovery is closed but also stating that some motions
cannot be deferred "if they are to serve to forestall needless expense and trial preparation").
130. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(d) (allowing judges to defer, deny, or take other appropriate action
with respect to a premature summary-judgment motion).
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but it is not a perfect remedy and adds a layer of delay and expense. Far
better if the motion had not been brought prematurely in the first place.
But we also don't want to discourage parties from bringing motions
earlier in the case when they might advance the resolution of the action
or help reduce the cost and burdens of the pretrial activities to follow.
In the big picture, too late is just as bad as too soon.
The solution lies in our core principles of case managementcommunication and custom case-tailoring. There is no one-size-fits-all
answer to when a summary-judgment motion should be filed. There is
no rule any committee can write that will usefully distinguish in
advance between premature motions and motions filed too late to avoid
unnecessary work and expense. That determination is best madeindeed, can only be made-on a motion-by-motion and case-by-case
basis, informed by a meaningful dialogue between the court and the
parties. If courts and parties talked openly about summary judgment at
the Rule 16 conference, it would go a long way towards solving both
timing problems: it would help to avoid premature motions while at the
same time identifying issues that are good candidates for early
motions. 131

II.

TALKING ABOUT SUMMARY JUDGMENT AT "MOTION TIME"

In Part I, we explored how early communication between judges and
parties about summary judgment can increase the opportunities for
avoiding unnecessary discovery and motion costs. Put another way,
early summary-judgment communications can increase the benefits of
summary judgment. In Part II, we turn to the role of communication in
containing the costs and burdens of summary judgment.
We think prevailing summary-judgment practice needlessly increases
the cost and burden of summary judgment. First, the prevailing practice
is for parties to make and respond to summary-judgment motions with
full briefs and extensive submissions that consume large amounts of the
parties' and then the court's time and resources. Some motions warrant
that expenditure, but many do not. Second, the prevailing practice is for
judges to resolve summary-judgment motions by issuing written
decisions on the papers, without oral argument. That too is a high-cost
process that makes sense in some cases but not in others.

131.

See SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 7, at 73-74 (discussing the role of Rule 16

conferences in identifying potential summary-judgment motions, determining timing, and
coordinating discovery); Schwarzer, supra note 51. at 221 (discussing motion timing benefits of
early discussion).
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We encourage courts to consider two practices that might help them
to avoid many of these costs. First, courts could consider holding
premotion conferences (either in person or by telephone or
videoconference), during which the would-be moving party identifies
what motion will be made and the basis for it, and the would-be
responding party outlines the likely response. The judge and the parties
then can make an early assessment of whether the motion raises a real
matter for summary judgment and, if so, what the focal issues are. The
purpose is not to seek leave to file a motion-Rule 56 provides leavebut to allow the judge and the parties to discuss what the motion and
response will involve. Judges with experience holding premotion
conferences report that futile or unnecessary motions often can be
avoided and the motions that are filed are streamlined and focused.
Second, courts could give greater consideration to setting summaryjudgment motions that are filed for oral argument. The premotion
conference can be viewed as a kind of oral-argument preview of a
proposed motion, creating an opportunity to reduce the cost and work of
determining whether there are genuinely disputed facts and whether
judgment is appropriately granted as a matter of law. Oral argument
after motions and briefs are filed can do even more to improve the
judge's understanding of the parties' arguments and proof. It also
creates flexibility in the presentation of issues. When parties must rely
solely on their briefs, they feel the need to prophylactically raise and
respond to every possible issue, even though most won't matter to the
outcome of the motion. Finally, judges who hear oral argument give
themselves the opportunity to rule from the bench, issuing written
decisions on an as-needed basis, which also can greatly reduce the time
and work involved.
These practices are simply an extension of our main thesis-that the
summary-judgment process could be greatly improved by embracing
the core case-management values of communication and custom
tailoring. If the judge and the parties talk about potential motions
before they are made, they can custom tailor the motions process by
avoiding motions that reveal themselves to be unwarranted, by quickly
resolving motions that have clear answers, and by focusing the formal
presentation of motions that warrant a fuller examination. If the judge
and the parties continue the conversation by holding oral argument on
the motion, they can custom tailor the resolution process by
streamlining and improving the presentation of the evidence and
arguments and by affording the court an opportunity to make an oral
ruling.
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A. Premotion Conferences
Judge Brock Hornby recently lamented (quipped?) that summary
judgment is anything but summary.13 2 As Judge Hornby noted, "The
term 'summary judgment' suggests a judicial process that is simple,
abbreviated, and inexpensive."133 Few people we know would use
those terms to describe the federal summary-judgment process as it
typically exists. Instead of being quick, simple, or cheap, the summaryjudgment process is more likely to be slow, complicated, and
expensive. 134 At its worst, it is an elaborate and costly exercise in waste
and overkill. No wonder Judge Hornby concluded that summary
judgment should be renamed "motion for judgment without trial," in the
interests of truth-in-labeling and reducing false hopes.1 35
Why is summary judgment so unsummary-like? In part, it is because
sound and informed legal analysis is hard work that requires effort and
care. Ultimately, a summary-judgment analysis requires the judge to
make a legal decision-the sufficiency of a claim or defense for trialin a context where a mistake can result not just in an error but the
deprivation of a constitutionally protected right. By its nature, summary
judgment is not a process that could ever be made to be carefree and
easy, and it would trivialize the stakes involved to indulge in that type
of fantasy. That being said, the standard approach to motions and
briefing makes the process much harder and costlier than it needs to be.
The absence of any conversation and the exclusive reliance on paper
submissions practically guarantee overkill. Parties seek summary
judgment by filing written motions accompanied by written briefs,
which themselves are accompanied by written supporting materials.
This "full briefing" model leads to the parties doing unnecessary work
in two ways. First, the briefs invariably address matters that will end up
having no bearing on the outcome of the motion. Second, the parties
invariably go to great lengths to support or oppose assertions of fact that
will have no bearing on the outcome of the motion or that could have
been adequately supported or opposed without nearly as much fuss.
Probably the greatest inefficiency caused by fully briefing all
summary-judgment motions is that the parties almost always end up
addressing issues that the court will not reach and that will play no role
in the outcome. In saying that, our purpose is not to criticize the

132.
133.
134.
135.

Hornby, supra note 41, at 273.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 284.
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lawyers. To a certain extent, they don't have much choice.1 36 The
party making the motion is flying blind in two respects. The party does
not know what issues the court will eventually think matter. And the
party must guess at-but can never know exactly-what the opposing
party's response will be. Under these circumstances, the natural
tendency is to expand the scope of the motion and brief to include issues
that might bear on the outcome.1 37 Responding parties face their own
similar uncertainties and thus have their own incentive to raise
peripheral or less important issues protectively.
Some factors do constrain the scope of the briefs. Rule 11 applies to
summary-judgment papers.1 38 Page limits exist in substantial part to
force lawyers to prioritize and prune. And lawyers are taught as early
as first-year moot court that weaker arguments are better omitted lest
they dilute the impact of, or distract the court's attention from, stronger
arguments. These constraints surely play some role in keeping motions
and briefs from growing completely wild. But the first constraintRule 11-culls only the unsupportable arguments; it does nothing to
identify the dispositive issues, let alone ensure that the briefs stick to
them. The second and third constraints could lead parties to identify the
most relevant issues, but they share a common and inherent limitationthey require the parties to speculate and predict. Faced with a choice
between spending time and money addressing issues that might not
matter and risking not having raised the issue that would have been
critical, we cannot be surprised when lawyers more often opt for the
former over the latter. For most lawyers, the risk is too much for the
reward.
A second problem with the full-briefing model is inefficiency and
overkill in the presentation of supporting and opposing proofs. This is
another area where uncertainty leads to excess. In advance, a party that
makes an assertion of fact does not know if the opposing party will
accept it or contest it. How much time and money go into supporting
facts that are never contested? In addition, parties making and opposing
assertions of fact commonly go overboard in listing their support. In at
136. We are not suggesting that lawyers bear no responsibility for the cost of the summaryjudgment process. As others have recognized. the fact that lawyers usually bill by the hour may
also explain, at least in part, why lawyers so often "overdo it" with their summary-judgment
papers. See Hornby. supra note 41, at 282; Wood. supra note 18. at 250 ("Discovery and
summary judgment are the engines of a lot of billing.").
137. As Judge Hornby put it, '"everything-but-the-kitchen-sink' sometimes seems the rule-ofthumb." Hornby, supra note 41, at 282.
138. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See generally GENSLER. supra note 52, at 982 ("The summary
judgment motion-and any briefs or other papers submitted in support of or in opposition to the
motion-are subject to the requirements of Rule I .").
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least some cases, this is because the party does not want to risk coming
up short in the eyes of the court. As Mr. Micawber might put it, a little
too much support is happiness, but coming up just short would be
disaster. 13 9 Finally, putting proofs in writing can be a time-consuming
and difficult process even under the best of circumstances. Things that
can be made perfectly clear when spoken may prove to be very difficult
to capture fully on the page.1 40 The best solution may lie in finding
better words, but the easier fix is often to just add more of them.
The situation we describe is not a pretty one. It is also the antithesis
of what summary judgment would look like if we applied our core
principles of case management. First, there is no communication
between the judge and the parties. Lawyers file omnibus motions and
take a blunderbuss approach to briefing because, having never talked
about the likely grounds for a proposed motion with the judge or the
opposing party, they lack any solid guidance for taking a more focused
approach. Second, the lawyers follow a prescribed briefing scheme for
all of the issues raised in the motion, response, or reply.14' No effort is
made to custom tailor the motion and briefing process to fit the needs of
the case. These points are related. The reason that the parties approach
each round of motions the same way is that they never talk about the
would-be motion and expected response, either among themselves or
with the judge, to determine whether the motion really needs to be
made, which issues are genuinely contested, which issues appear to be
dispositive, and how those issues could most efficiently be presented to
the court. And by not having a conversation about what the motion and
briefing process actually needs to cover in that case, they also,
necessarily, do not have a conversation about the things that simply
don't need to be briefed or addressed at all.
Premotion conferences with the parties before summary-judgment
motions are filed could provide a solution to many of these problems.142
139. "Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure nineteen nineteen six, result
happiness. Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure twenty pounds ought and six,
result misery." CHARLES DICKENS, DAVID COPPERFIELD 185 (Random House, Modern Library
1940) (1849).
140. See PAUL R.J. CONNOLLY & PATRICIA LOMBARD. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JUDICIAL
CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: MOTIONS 57 n.61 (1980) (noting that fact
issues often are easier to explain orally than in written briefs).
141. By prescribed, we mean that it is set by that district's local rules or by an individual
judge's requirements. The prescribed method, of course, varies by district and judge.
142. Here too. we are not the first commentators to make this suggestion. See CIVIL
LITIGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL, supra note 12, at 54 58 (discussing prefiling conference
mechanism and potential benefits): MCL 4th, supra note 59, § 11.34, at 46 ("To avoid the filing
of unproductive motions, the court may require a prefiling conference to ascertain whether issues
are appropriate for summary judgment, whether there are disputed issues of fact, and whether the
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The purpose of the procedure is to have an exchange of information that
will allow the court to tailor the motion process to the needs of the case.
Though the details of the procedure can vary, the basic idea is that,
before a party may file a summary-judgment motion, the party must ask
for an informal conference during which the judge and the parties will
talk about the would-be motion and anticipated response. The judge
can (but need not) ask the moving party to submit a short (typically no
more than two or three pages) letter outlining the scope and grounds of
the intended motion. A short response may be allowed (but is not
essential), to be filed within a few days of receiving the moving party's
letter. The purpose of these submissions is to set a basic agenda for the
conference. They are not surrogates for briefs. One of the primary
purposes of the premotion conference is to see if briefs are actually
needed, and if so on what issues. The conference itself is held shortly
after the request is made, typically within a week or two. It is on the
record and can occur either with the lawyers attending in person (our
preference) or by telephone or videoconference.
Many motions will be avoided or greatly narrowed as a result of the
premotion conference. The discussion may identify some claims,
defenses, or issues for which a grant of summary judgment would be so
clearly warranted that a motion is no longer needed to resolve it. For
example, in many employment adverse action cases, the plaintiff will
include a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In most states, the elements of that claim are quite demanding and
difficult to satisfy. If the discussion reveals that the plaintiff cannot
meet those demands, the plaintiff may agree to withdraw the claim
without the need for full briefing. Alternatively, the discussion may
reveal that a particular claim, defense, or issue cannot be resolved
without weighing facts or assessing credibility. The defendant may then
choose not to make that motion. In a different vein, every judge has
heard about lawyers who file summary motions for inappropriate
reasons, such as to "educate the judge." 43 A premotion conference will
reveal those motions (which are almost never valid) for what they are
and likely avoid the need for any further work by the parties or the
court.

motion, even if granted. would expedite the termination of the litigation."): Hornby, supra note
41, at 284 ("[J]udges could require conferences, after discovery is complete, to discuss where
cases stand before summary judgment motions can be filed.").
143. MOORE ET AL.. supra note 52. § 56.08[7] ("Summary judgment motions pursued as a
means to 'educate the court' when there is no realistic chance of success on the motion are
problematic and, if sufficiently weak, may violate Rule I .").
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The premotion conference discussion can also focus and streamline
the briefing process for the motions that do get made. Most of the time,
there are no more than a handful of pivotal issues. During the
premotion conference the judge can get the parties to identify which
parts or aspects of the claims or defenses are being contested-and
which ones are not-and then ask the parties to direct their briefs to the
disputed issues. The result is a much shorter and much more focused
brief. Moreover, having participated in the premotion conference, the
judge is in a much better position to resolve the motions that are briefed
for the simple reason that the judge now has a feeling for the context
and the background of the motion.
The time spent holding the premotion conference is well worth it.
The conferences typically do not last long. Most conferences last
between twenty and thirty minutes, though they can be shorter or longer
depending on the circumstances. This short investment of the judge's
and the parties' time can pay off in a significant saving of time and
effort. Some motions are avoided entirely. Many motions are greatly
narrowed. The motions that are made are more targeted and more
focused, and usually shorter. The parties have avoided the costly
process of filing motions, responses, and replies "in the dark." The
court has avoided the work of slogging through the thick stack that
results. 144 The case continues to progress. Everyone benefits.
We are convinced that judges who follow a premotion conference
procedure will find that they spend much less time resolving summaryjudgment motions than they currently do. The premotion conference
mechanism has already proved to be an effective way of dealing with
discovery disputes.14 5 Many judges have told us that most of the
disputes are resolved during the conference, either because the parties
work through the problem during the discussion or because the judge is
able to rule on the spot. Full briefing is reserved for those motions that
need it, and the briefs are invariably shorter and more focused as a
result of the discussion. There is no reason why similar benefits cannot
be attained in the summary-judgment context. Our former colleague on
144. See Hornby, supra note 41. at 275 (describing work required of judges and their law
clerks to analyze fully-briefed and supported summary-judgment motions).
145. See S.D.N.Y. L. Cv. R. 37.2 ("No motion under Rules 26 through 37 inclusive of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall be heard unless counsel for the moving party has first
requested an informal conference with the Court by letter and such request has either been denied
or the discovery dispute has not been resolved as a consequence of such a conference."). Judge
Rosenthal requires premotion conferences for discovery disputes in her standing procedures for
civil cases. See Procedure 5.C.1, available at http://www.txs.uscourts.gov/district/judges/lhr/
lhr.pdf ("The party wishing to make any discovery motion must arrange for a conference with the
court before the preparation and submission of motion papers.").
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the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, Judge John G. Koeltl, has required
premotion conferences for summary-judgment motions for many
years.14 6 He is an ardent advocate and has told us many times that the
conferences repeatedly result in motions being avoided entirely or being
greatly narrowed and focused. The Southern District of New York
recently included a premotion conference requirement in its pilot project
on managing complex civil cases.1 47
A premotion conference requirement can be adopted on a districtwide basis by local rule or by an individual judge through a standing
order or a case-specific order.
Districts and individual judges
unquestionably have authority to create a similar mechanism for
summary-judgment motions. Rule 56 leaves it to districts and judges to
establish their own practices for how motions are made and briefed. 14 8
Rule 16 explicitly states that a court may hold a pretrial conference for
the purpose of "determining the appropriateness and timing of summary
adjudication under Rule 56."149
Importantly, we are not suggesting a procedure by which parties must
obtain permission to file a summary judgment motion. 150 Rule 56
provides for summary-judgment motions and it does not require
permission from the court before it can be used. The purpose of the
premotion conference is solely to provide an opportunity for the judge
and the parties to talk about possible motions before they are filed, to
try to identify and, if possible, reach agreement on the subjects the
motion will address and what issues and evidence will be the focus.
Judges with experience in using the procedure report that the conference
does not lead them to order the parties to file certain motions or to not
file others. There is no need to do so. The discussion itself provides the
lawyers with the guidance they need.

146. See Individual Practices of Judge John G. Koelt1 § 2.A. (Oct. 2011), available at
http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/cases/show.php?db=judge info&id=385 (describing premotion
conferences that are required before making a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary
judgment); see also Cecil et al., supra note 3, at 897 (noting Judge Koeltl's practice).
147. See REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS COMMITTEE: PILOT PROJECT REGARDING
CASE MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES FOR COMPLEX CIVIL CASES 8 (2011), available at

http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/rules/ComplexCivil Rules Pilot.pdf ("Pre-motion conferences
should be held for all motions except motions for reconsideration, motions for a new trial, and
motions in limine.").
148. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee's note (2010) (emphasizing that the new
provisions of subdivision (c) regarding ways to support an assertion of fact do not prescribe
motion or briefing practices. which are left to the district or individual judge to determine).
149. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(E).
150. See Wood, supra note 18, at 250 (describing a procedure in which parties must seek
permission to file a summary-judgment motion).
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Looking back, summary-judgment practice in the twenty-five years
since the Trilogy has been dominated by efforts to contain it and
improve it with more and better rules. The briefing schemes that have
proliferated in the local rules across the country are one
manifestation. 1i But the answer will not be found in more rules or
more one-size-fits-all schemes because the problem has never been one
of there being too few rules or too little structure.15 2 The problem is
that there is too little communication.
No standardized scheme,
however brilliantly designed it might be, can tailor the motion and
briefing process as well as the judge and the parties can simply by
talking it through before the motion is made and briefed. If we want to
reduce the cost and burdens of the summary-judgment process and the
amount of time it takes, the best thing we can do is to get judges and
lawyers talking about the process before the work is performed and
those costs are incurred.
B. Oral Argument
Our final recommendation is that judges consider more often holding
oral argument on summary-judgment motions. Our reasons underlying
this recommendation once again turn to the core principles of active
judicial case management. First, we think oral argument presents an
opportunity for the judge and the parties to communicate in a way that
written arguments cannot fully duplicate. Second, we think holding oral
argument allows the court to custom tailor the argument process-and
the resolution process-to the particular needs of the case.
Lawyers frequently bemoan the lack of oral argument in district
courts.15 3 As summary-judgment motions have seemingly increased in
use and importance, the frequency of oral argument on those motions
151. See MOORE ET AL., supra note 52, § 56.70[5] (discussing range of motion and briefing
practices under local rules). Another manifestation is the Civil Rules Advisory Committee's
recent effort to enshrine the so-called point-counterpoint motion and briefing scheme into Rule
56. See Wood. supra note 18. at 245-48 (discussing point-counterpoint proposal and the reasons
for its eventual abandonment).
152. See Hornby, supra note 41, at 283 ("Constant efforts to simplify, through local rules and
procedures, perversely drive up legal expense .... ).
153. See Mark R. Kravitz. Written and Oral Persuasion in the United States Courts: A
District Judge's Perspective on theirHistory, Function, andFuture, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
247, 255 (2009) ("[A]t a recent hearing of the Judicial Conference's Civil Rules Advisory
Committee on proposals to amend Rule 56 ... a chief complaint of practitioners-plaintiffs' and
defendants' lawyers alike-was that district court judges rarely, if ever, provide an opportunity
for oral argument on summary judgment motions."); Michael A. McGlone, The Silence of Oral
Argument. 58 FED. LAW. 4, 4 (2011) ("There was a time, in the federal system. when in-person
motion practice with oral argument was very active. Unfortunately. such now seems to be. in
many of the federal districts, a distant, albeit fond, memory of the past.").
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has seemingly declined. 154 Lawyers complain that they do not see the
trial judge between a Rule 16 conference-which may itself be done on
the basis of a report that sets out proposed dates for a scheduling order
and has no live interaction between judge and parties-and the trial
itself, which is often avoided by settlement. As Judge Patrick E.
Higginbotham recently put it, "The faces of the United States district
courts are fading."1 55 Holding an in-person or some form of "live" Rule
16 or premotion conference reduces this sense that the judge is isolated
and inaccessible. 156 Holding oral argument on summary judgment
motions not only reduces this sense of the invisible judge, it can also
make the trial judge faster and better at ruling on the motions.
Judge Mark R. Kravitz, a district judge after 20 years as an appellate
advocate, has written persuasively about the benefits of oral argument
on substantive motions. 157 Oral argument is responsive in ways that a
written brief cannot be. Counsel may not cover in the brief what the
judge thinks is important. 5 8 Counsel may have confused the judge in
ways that oral argument alone can clarify. The parties' briefs may be
"two ships passing in the night, neither ever coming to grips with the
other side's key points." 59
Oral argument at the district court is free from the harsh time
constraints of the appeals court. The judge can devote as much time as
she wants, asking questions and probing the answers. Argument is a
chance for the judge to try ideas or approaches out on the lawyers and
understand the flaws before enshrining them in an opinion. Argument
is a chance for the judge to test her own understanding of the case and
154. A recent study found that on average 30% of summary-judgment motions received some
type of hearing or oral argument, though the range was from 3% to 73% depending on the
district. See INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., CIVIL CASE PROCESSING IN
THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: A21ST CENTURYANALYSIS 51 (2009) (surveying eight federal

districts).
155. Patrick E. Higginbotham, The Present Plight of the United States District Courts, 60
DUKE L.J. 745, 745 (2010).
156. See Hornby. supra note 41. at 284-85 (noting that holding oral argument takes the
summary-judgment process "out of the back room," puts a "human face" on it, and demonstrates
to the parties and the public that the court takes the process seriously); Kravitz, supra note 153, at
263 ("Part of the reason that the English legal system has clung to oral argument is the English
belief that justice must be seen in order to be done."); see also E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER,
THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 219 20 (1988) (discussing the value
litigants place on having a meaningful opportunity to state their case to a neutral decisionmaker).
157. See Kravitz, supra note 153, at 263-64.
158. Id. at 262; see also William H. Rehnquist, Oral Advocacy: A DisappearingAct, 35
MERCER L. REV. 1015, 1021 (1984) ("Counsel can play a significant role in responding to the
concerns of the judges, concerns that counsel won't always be able to anticipate in preparing their
briefs.").
159. See Kravitz, supra note 153, at 262.
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get answers to questions that were not covered, or not covered
adequately, in the briefs. Argument may result in concessions that
reduce the need for judges to decide or address certain issues, even if
they were covered in the briefs.1 6 0
Because it is interactive, and because it allows the judge to probe and
question and the parties to respond and explain, oral argument can
"provide judges with a measure of confidence in their decision making
that cannot be provided by written briefs alone."1 6 1 At times, oral
argument will clarify and confirm the parties' positions and the merits
to a point that lets the court rule from the bench, 16 2 saving the effort and
time that otherwise would be needed to prepare a written opinion.163 At
other times, the oral argument will reveal that further research or further
analysis is needed on critical points before a decision can be made.
Either way, the judge usually will have a better understanding of the
case and the important, contested issues afterwards, and that allows the
decision to be reached faster and the opinion to issue sooner regardless
of the form it takes. 164
The prospect of oral argument can also improve the briefing process,
especially when it is paired with a premotion conference. As discussed
above, the premotion conference can be used to weed out issues that do
not need briefing and focus the briefs on the key issues. Lawyers will
feel much more comfortable omitting side issues or issues that might be
conditionally important if they know that they will have a chance to
raise or respond to them at oral argument should they prove to be more
important than first thought.165 The prospect of oral argument can also
lead lawyers to be more reasonable and forthright in their briefs. As
Judge Kravitz explained:
When arguing in a written brief with one's opponent, all the incentives
are to be unreasonable, and that is especially true if counsel knows
there will not be any argument, and therefore, counsel will not have to
160. See id. at 270 ("Oral argument, therefore, allows me to clarify issues, obtain concessions.
gain perspective, and even eliminate issues that I might otherwise have to discuss in a written
opinion.").
161. Id. at 267.
162. See id. at 269 (noting the practice of writing out thoughts in advance before delivering a
decision orally, and generally waiting a week or so to deliver the opinion).
163. See CONNOLLY & LOMBARD, supra note 140, at 57 (noting the correlation between the
frequency of written opinions and the length of disposition time); STEVEN FLANDERS, FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURTS 31 (1977) (analyzing whether routine oral argument speeds disposition time and finding

qualified support that it does).
164. See Kravitz, supra note 153, at 269-70 ("1 find oral argument is a time saver. It makes
me more efficient and effective.").
165. See CONNOLLY & LOMBARD, supra note 140, at 57 n.6 1.
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answer to a judge for what was written in the brief. Lawyers may feel
perfectly at ease making extreme arguments in their papers that they
would never make with a straight face directly to a judge. In contrast,
all of the incentives on counsel are to be reasonable at argument, because there they are in a face-to-face conversation with a knowledgeable and prepared judge. That is wh concessions are made at oral argument and rarely, if ever, in briefs. 66
The result-a more focused brief targeting identified key issues and
making more reasonable arguments with less misdirection and blustershould be an appealing prospect to any judge.
For oral argument to work well, however, the parties must understand
what is expected.1 67 Because oral argument is no longer common, the
parties must understand that the judge wants argument, not a statement
that the parties rest on what they have said in their briefs. It is
sometimes helpful for the judge to set out specific questions or aspects
that she wants the parties to address.1 68
Oral argument on a dispositive motion can be an invaluable
supplement to the briefs as well as the previous exchanges between the
judge and the parties we have recommended. Oral argument allows
both the parties and the judge to have more confidence that the
summary-judgment motion has been properly, thoughtfully, and
efficiently managed, considered, and decided.
III. CONCLUSION
"Properly used, summary judgment helps strip away the underbrush
and lay bare the heart of the controversy between the parties. It can offer a fast track to a decision or at least substantially shorten the track.
But proper use of the rule is the sine qua non of its utility."
- William W. Schwarzer 1 69

166. Kravitz, supra note 153, at 265.
167. The oral argument proceeding itself "provides a useful opportunity for a court to
communicate its standards and expectations to the bar generally. Other lawyers awaiting
argument on other motions are generally in the room, and they obtain useful, informal guidance."
FLANDERS, supra note 163. at 31. We recently participated in a conference where the topic of
oral argument on summary-judgment motions came up, and several attorneys present said that
early in their careers they had learned a great deal about motions argument by attending
arguments in other cases, usually in state court where motions are more frequently set for
argument.
168.

See CIVIL LITIGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL. supra note 12, at 53 (recommending

that judges who schedule oral argument on motions consider "advising counsel of the particular
issues on which you want oral argument").
169.

SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 7, at 8.
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Twenty years ago, Judge Schwarzer recognized that summary
judgment, for all of its potential benefits, must be used wisely in order
to be used well. We think summary judgment is used best when judges
remember to follow the core principles of active judicial case
management.
First, judges and parties should communicate about summary
judgment, from the first case-planning conference under Rule 16 to the
time when motions are to be made and briefed and through their
presentation and resolution. Talking about summary judgment early in
the case allows the judge and the parties to use it at the right time for the
right issues.
Talking about summary judgment at a premotion
conference can help to avoid needless motions and focus the ones that
are made. Talking about summary judgment motions at oral argument
can further clarify the merits and streamline the court's resolution of the
motion.
Second, summary-judgment practice cannot be effective if courts and
parties handle it the same way-doing the same things according to the
same script-in every case. Summary judgment must be tailored to the
needs of the case. The tailoring process begins at the Rule 16 stage.
Using the information the court obtains from the parties after talking
about summary judgment, the court can guide the parties on
determining whether early motions are appropriate-which may narrow
the case or lead to an early resolution-and on conducting discovery to
best target and efficiently obtain the discovery that will be needed for
all motions. The tailoring process can (and we think generally should)
continue with a premotion conference between the judge and the parties
to discuss the intended motion and the likely response. Using that
information, the judge and the parties may be able to avoid some
motions entirely and to greatly focus briefing for the ones that are made.
Finally, the tailoring process can continue with oral argument. Oral
argument is the apogee of custom tailoring. By definition, it can take as
long as needed and cover whatever issues the judge and the parties think
deserve the most attention. Afterwards, the court can choose her
method of ruling (from the bench or with a written opinion) and will be
in a better position to do so quickly and efficiently.
These suggestions are not the stuff of abstract jurisprudence. They
are practical suggestions to improve the way lawyers, litigants, and
judges approach one of the most consequential-and most costly and
burdensome-aspects of civil litigation. The downsides seem few. The
potential benefits seem many and large. Those who have tried these
techniques report that they can be very effective and helpful in reducing
costs and work, without diminishing-indeed, while enhancing-the
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quality of the process and the quality of the result. This sounds to us
like Rule 1. If judicial management of summary judgment gets us
closer to those goals, it has done its job.

